Red Constantino: So that's what we're going to tackle and. Who exactly will be taking responsibility and who will be accountable and what common solutions we can work on. So - I think that was the background, I think it's time for us to go straight into our topic and we're trying to answer that by asking the bold question "What is going wrong in the global financial system and what are the consequences for climate vulnerable people?" First person I'll be asking is Professor Gallagher. Kevin, you've been leading research on the Bretton Woods institutions and international environmental and economic policy issues. A key macroeconomic concern for climate vulnerable countries is how a lack of financial protection against climate fueled risks is devastating their economies and increasing their instability. Could you share with us how the debt and climate crisis are interlinked and what reforms of the international financial architecture are needed to address this and why there's still a persistent thinking that there is no debt crisis. It's only a problem of poor countries. Kevin?

Kevin Gallagher: Great. Thanks so much, Red. Thanks for inviting me. But also, I welcome all of you folks to view this satellite campus here. Do I need to go up here? I'll be super quick so we can have some conversation, I think contrary to the plain debt view the World Bank and the UN have a better view of the situation here. And I would argue that 100% this is a climate, excuse me, a debt crisis that we're in and that it's inextricably linked to the climate and development crises and the two are accentuating each other. And so any action that happens on debt needs to improve climate and development at its center. So a quick little overview. How did we get here on the debt issue and how is it accentuating climate vulnerability and our ability to respond to climate change and build recoveries that are in line with our climate and development goals? And we've since the since the 2008 financial crisis, the United States is engaged in easy money policy or quantitative easing and massive expansionary fiscal and monetary policy for a long, long time. Which was copied by all the other major central banks from the big key currencies in the world. And that pushed out credit to emerging market and developing countries at a scale that we haven't seen in history, especially for what people call the frontier economies or the Zambia's and the Ghana's and the world, that before the 1990s and so forth weren't really getting into international finance except for from international institutions. That was pretty good for a little bit of time. It really helped expand economic growth in the global South. It also pushed up exchange rates and made them more strong relative to the currencies that they were being lent in. And so when developing countries saw that they had a lot of growth and they saw that their exchange rates were appreciating, that gave them the idea that they had ever more collateral to borrow, ever more. And right before the COVID crisis and the beginning of the poly crisis, international debt levels and emerging market developing
countries were back to all time highs. The lightning bolt has been what folks are calling the poly crisis. First when COVID hit, the United States and the other key central banks put together a series of currency swaps to protect our economies. And by doing that, there was a flight to safety, meaning that investors in foreign currencies that were in the Philippines, that were in Ghana and were in Haiti pulled their money out of those countries to be able to put their money in the safety of the countries that had saved and ringfence their institutions. So that was the first moment, that shocked to an already high level of international debt that was in the world. And to bring it to your broader question Red, that signified one key failure of the sort of international system is that we didn't have a multilateral approach to responding to this. Basically, the United States Fed protected itself and a handful of its geopolitical friends that caused this and accentuated the second shock. That was Putin's invasion into the Ukraine, which caused another set of outflows from foreign currency back to gold and key currency central banks in the global north. Third set of shocks have been the myriad level of climate shocks that have happened, whether it’s been the flood in Durban, the flood in Nigeria, the - obviously the floods in Pakistan that we’ve been experiencing at an accentuated rate during all of this period. And then the big one that really hit where - the hair that broke the camel’s back is the very late but partially necessary rapid increases in the interest rates, starting with the United States Federal Reserve and copied by the central banks of the key currencies. So you had all this debt buildup, which was fairly sustainable because there was an idea that interest rates would continue to be low forever, that the growth from all that investment would continue and that exchange rates would be relatively strong. But those four events: COVID, climate change, Ukraine, and interest rate hikes reversed that whole cycle. There was a flight of dollars in international currencies from the South that put downward pressure on their exchange rates. But the amount of debt that they owed was the exact same. And so that ballooned the amount of already unsustainable debt levels that were there. And now there's no growth or relatively low growth in these countries, the exchange rates are depreciated and they have to pay these international debts back in an environment where interest rate rises are at a new high and maybe rising maybe one or two more times over the course of this year, we’re avoiding any tail risks. This makes countries more vulnerable to climate shocks and - don't wanna be so depressing so early in the morning - But it makes it almost impossible to mobilize the kind of financing that we need to be able to respond to loss and damage over the last 20 years, which has been 20% of GDP of the V20 countries, and to mobilize the resources that we need to go forward. Anything that happens in World Bank evolution or the Bridgetown Initiative, etc., all super important projects that we are all working on here. But for a growing list of countries, we estimate around 69, they're just shut out of that system. And with respect to - this gets accentuated by climate change and climate change policy. When there is one of these climate events, whether it be a slow change in productivity and agriculture in Ghana, that hurts their ability to export or whether it be a flood or a hurricane. That kind of event obviously has major material damage on an economy and it makes that economy by definition a little uncertain and a little much more risky for an international investor to go in. So that further increases the interest rate and the price of capital for that particular country at exactly the time where they need to mobilize resources to be able to protect the people and to rebuild the infrastructure. But because the cost of capital is so insurmountable, they unfortunately cut corners by adjusting or pushing down spending in their economy to be able to pay their international debts and squeeze out inappropriate responses to these big problems. And so you’re not building that with better hotel groups and more climate smart infrastructure. You have to take the cheap route. Well, what could you do in a better world? You could go to the International Monetary Fund and they would be able to give you the kind of liquidity that would help you get back on your feet and be aligned with this kind of response. But right now, countries are very scared to go to the International Monetary Fund because their recipe is actually to further push adjustment, less spending and so forth, just so you can pay your international creditors. So countries only go there when they’re on the brink. And unfortunately, most of the world is on the brink right now. But without a robust global financial safety net by the International Monetary Fund, with all due respect, developing countries have really been shooting themselves in the foot rather than going to the IMF for one or two percent in 2020 or 2021. They went back to capital markets at 8 or 9%, or they went to China at 5% rather than 1 or 2% from the IMF. That shows that there are some implicit costs here of this kind of a program. So what do we need to do in general in terms of a broad, broad reform agenda that many of us been working on for decades? But it’s now or never - to quote the UNEP emissions gap report, it is, number one, emerging market developing countries need new sources of non-conditional liquidity. And the best way to do that, which we just tested in August of 2021, are major new issuances of special drawing rights. That needs to be coupled with re-channeling efforts. Because as we know, even though $650 billion worth of SDR is were issued into the world, only $21 Billion went to the poorest countries of the world, many of whom are V20 and CVF members. So we need recycling mechanisms for those. We have a couple of them that have been approved over the past couple of months, which are landmark and somewhat historical of $40 Billion Resilience and Sustainability Trust that the
IMF. New subsidization for the Poverty Relief and Growth Trust at the IMF and the African Development Bank and a number of other development vehicles that the countries can re-channel. Those are not ideal for a variety of reasons we get into in the Q&A, but at least they are mechanisms to get them off of the balance sheets of the rich countries that will never use them and get them to the global south. We need a lot more of that. Number two, we need fundamental reform of the World Bank, much more ambitious than what’s being talked about this week and not just increasing capital adequacy frameworks. We need a massive scale increase. My colleagues across the street released a paper today that the World Bank has to be a trillion dollar bank and has to be mobilizing trillion dollars in annual funding. But it’s not just about the money, it’s what’s done with it and what are the conditions on it. How much ownership and voice and representation the developing countries have in that - number two. And then the third key thing, which unfortunately is really hard to swallow and is really politically difficult, but therefore a group of - an increasing group of countries, as I said earlier, close to 70 - Now, in addition to those two things, we need significant debt relief and we need debt relief at a scale similar to what we were looking at in the late 1990s. In the late 1990s, we were right here before. We had debt distress and debt defaults happening all across the world and we were looking at the Millennium Development Goals and said there is no chance we will mobilize the finance for this. And the world came together largely because of civil society efforts and jubilee campaigns around the world and debt and development campaigns around the world, putting pressure on national capitals to do a massive level of debt relief. That included all the major credit creditor classes. At the time it was called the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and then the enhanced version of it, and then the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. The Songwe Stern Report that high level experts on climate finance, which Sarah is a member of and so is a number of other members of our task force, are a member of. Their somewhat conservative estimates are that we need to mobilize $2.4 trillion a year in financing between now and 2030 and then a trillion of it has to be in foreign currency from outside of the countries themselves. If you take that as a benchmark, the common framework that might have made a millimeter step forward yesterday, is still completely out of whack of the conversation that we’re about to have today. Number one, it doesn’t have eligibility for all the countries in debt distress. So Suriname and Sri Lanka and Pakistan, if it’s there the week after. Will not be able to use the mechanism. Number two, it doesn’t have a way for all creditors to engage in the process. And number three, it’s not linked to our climate or development goals. Despite the fact that every G20 country has ratified Paris and has an SDG plan. We’ve got a proposal that’s largely jointly endorsed by the by the V20 on how to deal with all three of those issues. One, make it eligible to anyone who’s in distress and get a better idea of what that debt distress is by incorporating climate and resource mobilization into debt sustainability analyses. Number two, have what’s called a Brady-like scheme where you guarantee the restructured bonds by the private sector and commercial creditors from China so that they can at least when they do get a restructured bond that they can feel confident that they are actually going to get that money back. That proved to bring creditors to the table in the late 1990s in Mexico and Brazil. And if we link those new bonds to our climate and development goals, we have a fighting chance. I guess I’ll leave it there. Thank you.

**Red Constantino:** Thank you, Kevin. So there’s a reason why you go first, because you frame things. And Sara, you had a lot more space in the next segment, but we’re glad that you made it earlier. Would you have a few things to say and tier up for the solutions part later? Thank you.

**Sara Ahmed:** I mean just hearing Kevin, discuss that we’ve done this in the past, which means we can do it again. We can do it again now as well. What’s really critical here is when we look at debt sustainability analysis, it’s not when we look at debt sustainability analysis, it’s not really conducive to the investment that we need or they won’t drive the investment that we need this decade, which means that needs to be looked at again. The other thing that I’d like to flag is this issue of indebtedness. When - because we haven't invested in adaptation or resilience or the low carbon transition early enough, we’re saddled with all this risk. And so as a result of that, countries are becoming more and more indebted. So it’s this never ending cycle. And there are solutions currently that are being crafted by the likes of the previous G7 presidency in Germany with the V20 on the Global Shield against climate risk for prearranged funds. So there are all these solutions being crafted, but it has to be done in a systematic way where it’s part of this new financial package that’s hopefully - that hopefully will deliver for the most vulnerable countries.

**Red Constantino:** Concise - my thanks for that. We’ll get back to a lot more of those perspectives later. But Jwala, you are from a region that’s particularly - not just one of the most vulnerable, but is dealing with this really in a compelling way
because of the complexity of the problem. According to the IMF, debt levels in the Caribbean are averaging around 90% of GDP, excluding Haiti of course. How are your communities coping with this situation?

**Jwala Rambarran:** Thanks! First, let me set some context for the Caribbean region, and I’ll also make use of the sentiments expressed in the word cloud. First, Caribbean SIDirectors have been facing what we call a silent debt crisis for the past three decades. It is something that has been gradually developing and has now reached the point where clearly it has reached crisis proportions. At the end of 2022, the average debt to GDP ratio in the region was close to 80%. Of course, within that we have about five countries with debt to GDP ratios beyond 100% of GDP. So we are no longer talking about a liquidity issue, but really a solvency issue. And of course, linked to that, a number of factors have obviously contributed to this debt accumulation. But a key one, of course, is climate change just by virtue of location. Most Caribbean countries are located within the North Atlantic basin, which means that basically the six months of the year, we are always, always on edge. And because what we’ve noticed since 1995 is that there’s been an increase in the number of more powerful tropical storms and hurricanes. But these have also become more intense. And just to give you an example of that, the 2017 hurricane season was one I think that really gave us a sense of what the future would look like under climate change. And if we looked at a country like Dominica that had to face the ferocity of Hurricane Maria in September 2017. Hurricane Maria, the loss and damage there was 225% of GDP. I mean it was mind blowing, I would tell you to see the scale of devastation on this small island. Basically, 90% of all housing and public infrastructure, everything, everything was destroyed. No communication, no electricity. About one third of the population actually had to leave because there was no sense of how they could survive. And strange enough, three days after Hurricane Maria, Dominica had to make a debt payment. And that raises the issue of debt standstill and how fit is this global financial architecture. And even though if you go to Dominica and this is really a mountainous island and you look at the trees on the skyline of the mountain, you will still see scarring on those trees from Hurricane Maria. Six years, six years later. I mean, it tells you the scale of what they faced. Now, here’s the thing. You know, the words resilience, development, low climate ambitions came up in the [word] cloud. But Dominica actually is - I think is a country that we should be looking at carefully because despite this devastation, they stood up and said: We will actually build back better. And the country set this really ambitious goal to become the world’s first climate resilient nation. And they’ve actually put in place I mean, they didn’t just talk it. They’ve developed the policy framework and actually implemented the policy framework. And I mean, it’s fortunate that they have not been hit with another hurricane. So it’s not that we want that framework to be tested - the resilience to be tested. But the prime example of how you could start to build resilience in the face of adversity. So, you know, the words fear, worry - I mean, yes, those - we have to accept those. But at the same time, we must not accept defeat. We must rise to the occasion. Thank you.

**Red Constantino:** That’s very compelling, sir. And I’m taking a mental note, as I think my colleague said, Silent debt crisis, something that needs to be highlighted. Kairos - when you look at V20 countries, it affects at least $435 billion in debt service payments are due in 2022 to 2028, which is the same period when investments are badly needed. And yet we also know from the V20’s own work that 15 of the V20 economies’ wealth was wiped out in the last couple of years. Any comments on this?

**Kairos Dela Cruz:** I mean, the V20 debt report that was published last year shows that the next two years for V20 countries such as the Philippines will be super hard and simply because we have to balance debt payments versus our development strategies. Yesterday we attended the Philippine economic briefing here in D.C. and with so much pride, it was said that the Philippines increased its allocation for climate finance and climate action by 60% in the coming fiscal year. However, we still lack the connection on how much of that 60% is actually going to that certainly. How much of that 60% is actually contributing directly to activities that would increase resilience, which will allow us to keep a safe distance from disasters happening across the country. It was also recognized during the same briefing that debt servicing has been a long-standing issue for the Philippines, even prior to the pandemic. And it also shows that rising debt is at the back of the minds of a lot of developing countries, particularly in the Philippines. Rising debt is the second top risk in the Philippines, according to the World Economic Forum survey published January 2023. But we still lack the connection. We still lack the putting things together as part of the bigger puzzle. On how rising debt is actually related to our failure to respond to the rising challenges of climate change. And just to put things in - just to make things more real for the Philippines in particular, because I do think that the Philippines represents and connects with a lot of the V20 country members. Our Department of Finance says and estimates that roughly 27 billion or 1.5 trillion Philippine Pesos would be the amount of estimates in terms of increase...
of financial impacts, the financial impacts of climate disasters in the country in the next 50 years. Unfortunately, this estimate does not even take into account the IPCC findings in the new report that was released, which means that losses would be at this point might be underestimated. And we keep on saying for the past years that a big help that can be extended to developing countries would be actually pinpointing these gaps, because it’s easier said than done, particularly for developing countries trying to manage a lot of things - development, debt servicing, health care and so on. And just to again, to make things a bit more tangible and more real. In the last decade alone, the Philippines suffered at least 117 extreme weather events, from our Senate Economic Planning Office and its 2021 fiscal statement. The Department of Finance Bureau of Treasury cites the exposure of the country to natural disaster is a major source of downside risks for the national government’s fiscal position. And within the same quarter the FRS was released, the country already logged more than $1.5 billion worth of loss and damage. So that’s the yeah, that’s a general picture that most developing countries face. But I do agree with the colleague from CPDC - we have to rise up to these challenges.

**Red Constantino:** Thank you Kairos. We’re trying to catch up with time as well. And Vositha we’ll go straight to you. What’s the situation on the ground in Sri Lanka, which is still reeling from an incredible economic crisis where debt is at the epicenter of the tremors? What’s it like and could you share some insights? Over to you.

**Vositha Wijenayake:** Thank you very much. I hope you can hear me. That’s great. Thank you. So I think I just answer connecting to how climate and vulnerability and the debt would come to play a role. So I think we are moving towards progressively addressing debt and how we can build our capacity on the economic front. But I think what’s important is to look at how the vulnerabilities that are caused by debt could impact the resilience building related to climate change, because as everyone knows, climate change is one of the key threats to development. And Sri Lanka is one of the vulnerable countries or one of the most vulnerable countries. And looking at the work that we’ve been doing on the ground and looking at how resilience is being built and then how the adaptive capacities impacted in adverse weather due to that and due to the economic crisis creates a big issue on how we can focus on long term climate resilience. But I think there are entry points. There are opportunities that have come through this as well, because people are looking at climate finance, looking at how climate change action could be a means of addressing economic empowerment and also addressing debt. Connecting to CVF and V20 and also what we’ve been doing on the policy front. Sri Lanka has a prosperity plan that’s being developed and this could potentially be an entry point to looking at climate change and also addressing the debt issue. So there’s also work that we’ve been doing on the ground looking at risk transfer and looking at risk management, how these could be impacted in a positive way through actions that we do to address the debt recovery and also the transformation in a very transformative manner as well as innovative process would be something we need to look. I’ll park it for the moment and maybe come back afterwards. Thank you.

**Red Constantino:** Thank you. That was loud and clear. From our first round everyone should have a bit more concrete idea of the macroeconomic underpinnings of the problem we’re facing with the local perspectives, which grounded this discussion as well. And of course, this week, country leaders and civil society will be discussing international financial institutions, discussing things with IFIs on how to tackle these issues. Maybe we can move from problems into potential solutions and hear again from our experts about some ways forward. Of course, we will turn again to Professor Gallagher, who is chairing the debt relief for a green and inclusive recovery project and is working on new research on solutions for what we all need, which is a fit for purpose and climate proof financial system, together with a task force and development. Some insights Kevin on the work that you’re doing and why it’s important.

**Kevin Gallagher:** Thanks so much. Well, just 5 minutes. Yes, I got that first one was 10 minutes, I’m sorry. So I’ll try to compensate for the last time. Look, what motivates us and our team is a ambitious, longer term vision. Is a is an ambitious, longer term vision about the reform of the international institution, but a realistic approach to incremental reform along the way. I don’t think we’re going to go back to 1944 and all sit down and redo the entire system. I think it’s important for all of us to have a vision of what that should be and that work and grab every opportunity we can along the way to get along there. That this is the biggest crisis the developing countries have faced in this century. They were largely, not largely, but in many ways buffered a little bit from the 2008 crisis. And this time they’re actively involved. So in a bigger picture, in the longer term, we need to reform the international monetary system. And at the core of that is the International Monetary Fund, where we need to be able to have better surveillance so we can respond to climate shocks and mobilize the money.
that we need to be able to transition to a new world economy. It also needs to have emergency response functions that are more like SDR allocations that help countries on their own terms recover from crises. We need a World Bank and a system of development finance institutions that can help prime that pump. We need major regulations for the private sector. One of the figures that scares me the most every day is that in between 1980 and last year, the size of the global financial system, total assets and liabilities is going from $10 trillion to 500 trillion. But the amount of gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP or total investment has stayed the same everywhere except for in China. And that is not helping with growth. The growth that it does bring is relatively brown and unequal, and that our fundamental goal has to be taming the financial system towards our climate and development goals. So in addition to reforming IMF and World Bank and so forth, we need a real reform of the private sector to wire the private sector to our larger goals. So that's the way we wake up in the morning at the GDP center and just sort of try to think about sort of the big ambition that we need. But I'll quickly just quickly, just show a couple of slides about what we think, what we think is something we need to seize now. I should start by saying we need a real sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, a treaty based one that is fair and equitable, that is not going to happen in the next year. There is a common framework and there is now a consensus everywhere that it needs to be reformed. We have a proposal to reform quickly. Okay. Here's what it is right now. The common framework basically says: if you are poor, not if you're Suriname or Sri Lanka, like we just heard, you can come to this table. We will do the math and figure out what does it take just to get you back on your feet to the level of anemic spending that you had in 2019. We do that math. The Paris Club, who are the smallest creditors to most of these countries, will give you a significant haircut or debt reprofiling relative to that math. And then, you as V20 countries who are in distress, and we estimate there's 26 of them. You are on your own to seek commensurate treatment from your other creditors except for MDBs. They're off the hook. We don't think that's right. We go back to history. We say this needs to be reformed. One, make every country eligible and not eligible just on what it takes to get you back on your feet to anemic levels of spending in 2019. Do the debt sustainability analysis right that says what is a climate prosperity plan for this country? That's what they need to get to. And we need to anticipate the potential climate shocks. That math will tell you a different picture of a country than the math that the countries are currently getting. The debt sustainability analysis for Sri Lanka pretends that there was not a tsunami in 2004 that wiped out the country in order of magnitude larger than what happened in Pakistan, commensurate to the kinds of things that happened in Dominica, Saint Lucia, and others. After that real math, how do you compel the private sector, which - if you go back to the last slide real quick, one thing that you hear the narrative, especially in this town, it's seen as a China problem and that China is the fundamental cause of all this stuff and the fundamental barrier. How do you get Chinese commercial creditors, which are holding back, and the private sector into the table? This is just the V20 picture. V20 stock of debt is $686.3 billion. 36% is owed to private creditors, 20 to the World Bank, another 20 to other MDBs. The Paris Club, 13%. Then China owned 17%. So the Paris Club is the tail wagging the dog. They will do a reduction of some percentage of that 13%. The MDBs and the World Bank are off the hook and the private creditors in China point fingers at each other saying, Why should I give a break to Sri Lanka or to Ghana? Because you can just take the money and pay back PIMCO. And PIMCO says, Why should I give a break to Guy? Because you can just take the money and pay back China. We had this problem in the 1990s and what we did was use carrots and sticks and I’ll end here. We had a carrot where we said, We will compel you to come to the table by guaranteeing the new bonds that get restructured after the restructuring. So commensurate to our Sustainable Development Goals. Let’s say that that we estimate if you look at history, that the HIPC initiative that was a 64% haircut. On average, they've been about 38%. So regardless of what level that needs to really needs to be determined by a DSA, but after there is that haircut, you’re going to get new bonds and those are going to be guaranteed. So no matter what, you are going to get that money back. Those are to be guaranteed by guarantee fund at the World Bank and they've got plenty for there to have a standing guarantee facility. In addition to those carrots, we're going to have sticks. We're going to let you lend into arrears. We're going to have a standstill on payments, which David Malpass actually endorsed yesterday in his remarks. And we'll use some other regulatory sticks to be able to compel those folks to come to the table. That's the core of our proposal. If you look at the draft of the Accra to Marrakesh Agenda, this sort of guarantee V20 countries are asking for because V20 countries are serious. They're not saying we’re going to be profligate and waste the money on this debt release. We're actually - we want a way that we can work together and guarantee that you're going to get your money back. But it has to be calibrated to climate prosperity plans in a better future, not be anemic, teetering on the cliff that so many V20 countries were on in 2019.

Red Constantino: Thanks Kevin, as usual. Colleagues, I’d like to draw your attention to this report called Caribbean Emancipation 2030 - A Sovereign debt and climate justice Initiative for Caribbean Small Island Developing States. Jwala,
you’re the author. It’s not only a research report, it’s also a call for action. Would you share a little bit more about this really compelling report.

**Jwala Rambarran:** Sure. If I talk about what’s the objective of Caribbean Emancipation 2030 it’s important also to look at the debt composition of the Caribbean. And almost half of that debt is actually held by private creditors. So immediately we know that’s one issue. It Paris Club. The Paris club’s importance has dwindled over time in the Caribbean, so they hold less than 10% of debt. A country that is obviously taking up the slack is China. China is now become the most important bilateral landing partner in the Caribbean. So again, you have these playoffs. These trade-offs that are going to be taking place in the private sector and China. And it is not that Caribbean countries haven’t tried to shed off this - we have close to 18 debt restructurings episodes in the Caribbean over the last 20 years. So that’s almost one episode a year. Some countries have actually restructured debt more than once, twice in some, some go on three times. We know have the issue - Suriname has come up in the discussion. Suriname started its negotiation of creditors in September 2020. We are now in April of 2023 and as you know, there’s no end in sight. Because the private creditors - not that have not come to the table. But they’ve come to the table with a number of demands. And because Sri Lanka is inside an IMF program, the fund has resisted some of those demands. So you have this country now that is basically caught between the multilaterals and the private sector. So Caribbean Emancipation 2030, similar to the framework that Kevin spoke of, seeks a number of things. One, the main thing is to address the Caribbean Islands silent debt crisis once and for all. That’s really a major objective on. To do that, it speaks to a number of things. It says, first, we need to recognize that the Caribbean is really a special category of countries. They’re SIDS, but they are middle income SIDS with similar vulnerability and poverty issues as low income SIDS. So effectively they are SIDS, whether we use the per capita GDP criteria, obviously this has done a disservice to the region. The second is the word emancipation was put inside there deliberately because for the Caribbean emancipation carries in the term to freedom from slavery and a sense of freedom from indigenous oppression. So it’s really symbolic in terms of breaking the shackles of slavery, breaking the bondage of debt. And so it really seeks to connect emotionally to the people in the Caribbean. And then 2030, because that, of course, is the timeline that we have on the SDGs. So it’s meant to give this sense of urgency to what is required for emancipation. But that was also inspired by Jubilee because they looked at what happened with Jubilee 2000, which we consider to be the most important civil society action that took place in the last 20 years. And therefore, what it says is that while it is time not only for the Caribbean, but internationally, for global civil society to come together again to solve this problem, that’s kind of an indicator that it was civil society that was able to generate over $100 billion in debt cancellation for poor developing countries. In the case of the Caribbean, we are looking in somewhere between 20 to $50 billion. So it is a sizable chunk. So that’s really what is it is a nutshell and I think the report is available for reading. And in it, we also talk about a number of options that could be utilized similar to what Kevin said, because we’ve looked at what Barbados has introduced - natural disaster clauses into its bonds. We’ve also looked at the issue of insurance. Belize when it when it did its debt climate swap bond, it actually took out insurance. So what is the efficiency between a natural disaster clause and insurance? The Caribbean is also now starting to look at the possibility of debt for climate swaps and seeing what has happened in Belize example. We know Saint Lucia is actually actively contemplating a debt for climate swap, as well as Antigua. But these may not be in the traditional form. They may more be liability management type operations. But again, they do not fall under the general rubric of debt for climate swaps. But even while we do all this, there is a need for deeper reform and I join that call from Kevin - there is need for deeper reform. Because we looked at just look at the issue of the SDR rechanneling, to me pointed out the fact that 60 close to 60% of the SDRs went to the Global North that didn’t need it, and 40% went to the rest who needed it. And we said, well, let’s find a way to re-channel. But at the heart of that is the fact that - is the quotas that reflect this imbalance. And quotas again really are representative of the power relations in the IFIs, but particularly the IMF. And therefore, it comes down to the fact that quota reform must take place. And we’ve seen it, too, here in reforms on the governance side and the whole discussion from civil society around the nomination of the World Bank president. I mean, that reflects the democratic deficit evident in the institutions. At the same time, we also need to be aware that a number of the other players are creating institutions themselves, multilateral institutions, because they recognize that the traditional ones are not fit for purpose. You talk about the BRICS and the fact that we are now moving into multiple levels and you’re going to see a BRICS plus designation emanating across the global space. So I’ll leave it at that.

**Red Constantino:** Thanks, Jwala! Vositha, we go back to you. It is unmistakable to make connections between debt and climate impacts in different fora, UNFCCC but also where we are right now. And that also means it’s unavoidable to discuss
loss and damage and financing debt. What do you think about the arrangements that are currently on the table and the designs that should be there that don’t end up exacerbating one or the other and help most the vulnerable.

**Vositha Wijenayake:** Thanks. So looking at loss and damage finance and the UNFCCC process, I think one thing we need to look at is what happened in the transitional committee, the first meeting that happened in Egypt, end of March. So that would be an entry point for us to figure out how debt could be addressed through the loss and damage finance systems or how loss and damage finance mechanisms could be connecting to debt, addressing and developing countries, and looking at how vulnerabilities could be reduced. And similarly, or actually, that’s something even more important is how we can look at the finances coming into countries be scaled up. How can loss and damage finance be scaled up? How can we bring in different actors to the mechanisms that we’re discussing in the UNFCCC process? Because right now we’re looking at things like Global Shield, we’re looking at other options as well. In addition to the loss and damage fund that is being discussed and is in place and that needs to be functioning with money coming into it. So how can all these be working and how can the recommendations coming out of the transitional committee reflect these aspects is something I think developing countries, the most vulnerable countries and everyone actually needs to focus on. Additionally, I would like to highlight the fact that all these processes need to be inclusive and transparent and accountable. I think when we’re addressing debt, we kind of forget or even in finance systems, we kind of forget that inclusion and transparency element because things need to be fast tracked. We need to look at empowerment, we need to address prices. But it’s very important that all of these elements come together with transparency, accountability and inclusion so that multiple stakeholders could play a key role, not necessarily in the UNFCCC process, but overall looking at loss and damage finance as well as debt recovery. I think this has already come into discussion. This is being discussed. Those who are focusing on loss and damage finance, specifically are looking at a broader spectrum of finance needs, innovative finance solutions to address loss and damage finance, as well as debt recovery and restructuring and all these elements. So I think the start of the work is there. It’s a matter of seeing what might be best suited for countries, what might be the best elements to be taken into different processes and going forward to make bigger impact with ambitious actions that would address climate action and stuff like that. And thank you very much.

**Red Constantino:** Thank you Vositha. Kai, we’ll go back to you. In Sharm el Sheikh, delegates all virtually called for international financial institution reform, accelerate this reform and to develop a new vision and working mode that addresses and is actually relevant to the climate emergency, but which also addresses debt burdens. What’s your expectation and how do you see finance for this increasing? And maybe some comments on what others have said as well.

**Kairos dela Cruz:** Thank you Red. I think the IPCC AR6 illustrated that even higher stakes in keeping global warming below the 1.5 degree threshold. But the IPCC report also stresses that there’s a need to go beyond the false dichotomy of choosing and having to choose between mitigation and adaptation or climate action and resilience. In the Philippines and across the global south we do have to prioritize adaptation and addressing already existing loss and damage, and it is crucial to ensure that these efforts lead to mitigation co-benefits, not because the Paris Agreement requires us to do so, but mainly because for the long-term development and resilience of the country and the rest of the world. The unprecedented scale of the climate crisis means that these different initiatives we have been discussing all have important roles to play in a bigger puzzle, even in a longer time horizon, to ensure that climate and development finance spheres work together and not against each other. We wholeheartedly hardly agree with the task force of the IMF’s assessment that the fund must mitigate the balance of payments, impact short term climate shocks and damage and resilience in a manner that accelerates the intermediate and long-term development paths necessary. We also believe that the approach of the vulnerable 20 group of countries in introducing the rapid pace through the climate prosperity plans will actually work towards achieving these goals. ICSC, along with other CSOs, believe that the Accra-Marrakesh agenda that you all have there is one of the most comprehensive proposals on the table for making the international financial systems, particularly the World Bank and other global financial system, fit for climate. We join the V20 in expecting rewiring the global financial system as soon as possible within this decade, and putting together more Climate Prosperity Plans, which would aim to go beyond the UNFCCC and aims drive investments And as we have commented on the World Bank Evolution Forum the other day, we do believe that the World Bank would enjoy a lot of perspectives a pressure take, a more realistic stance of things if you have the V20 as separate constituency group in their discussion tables. Another thing that I feel strongly towards, and I have to agree with Vositha, is that a fit for climate financial system should have a very clear sense of accountability and
transparency. We've been discussing loss and damage, macroeconomic fundamentals, and usually within developing
countries, that remains on a very high level, speaking to the national and international areas of discussions. But at the
same time, you have local governments actually having to deal with climate impacts every day. And accountability is the
only equalizing factor for them to make sure that the money being raised for climate action, with the money being raised
for loss and damage actually contribute to alleviating their suffering from climate change impacts.

Red Constantino: Thanks Kai. The Accra-Marrakech agenda has been, the draft is being sent out for public comment. And
it’s one of the most important pieces of initiatives. What is in it? Why is it important and what do you expect or hope for by
the time the annuals kicks in?

Sara Ahmed: Thanks for asking the tough questions. So I think it’s important as a starting point to just give some color on
the debt profile. So Kevin showed some slides here on V20’s Sovereign Debt. And we also want to note that over the last
two decades V20 has indeed lost a trillion and is projected to lose 200 billion through to 2027 if we stay within the 1.5 limit
from the Paris Agreement. But as we know, as it stands now we are going to reach that limit. And so today this means that
the reform of the international financial system is critical, especially for climate threatened economies. We hear also from
our colleagues in the Caribbean about debt pauses and also inability to access certain treatments because they’re high
income. And what the V20 is asking for in this Accra-Marrakesh Agenda what it demands is that climate vulnerable
countries are given access and debt treatment is considered as part of this new agenda. In addition to that, it’s not just
about making available new funds, but it’s also transforming the entire financial system to actually work for developing
countries, because right now it’s almost like indentured slavery. The way financing is being delivered. And as soon as you
get that distress, the options available to you are very limiting in a time when you need to be investing in climate resilience.

So the rewiring of the global financial system through the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda is really to establish this coalition that is
ready and eager to realize a fit for climate global financial system. And looking towards Marrakesh, inputs from the V20, the
G24, the G7 - I see certain colleagues here around the room are working with these governments as well, and what they’re
able to bring to the table will very much support what options the V20 and other vulnerable countries will have available to
them. And so part of the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda includes the revolutionizing of risk management. And this is about pre-
aranged and trigger-based funds. Pre-arranged, ahead of time, we need that predictability. Trigger based so that it’s based
on data and science instead of what usually happens is the more vulnerable are asked to prove that impact occurred. And
so then they go to the donors or whatever other access points. The other thing that’s quite critical, and this is what Kevin
also highlighted, is debt relief. So, the net present value of debt for the 26 debt distressed countries in the V20 is about
$232.7 billion and the total debt relief, if we look at historical and HIPC scenarios, amounts to between $90 Billion and 150
billion USD. The debt crisis or the silent debt crisis is underway. And we know this. Even though maybe colleagues in the
North may disagree, it is underway. And that we need to ensure that the V20 and the vulnerable countries have options on
the table. At the same time, we need this pause in debt payments and with debt relief, and the reason for this is we know
that because climate impacts are increasing in scale and speed and intensity, there needs to be a way to chart a new
transformation of the economies. And imagine we can’t do that when the gun is pointed to our heads to deal with the debt
crisis. So it’s important that there is an option that is confirmed or at least that heads out route this year. And so looking to
June think the Macron summit is looking for a new global deal. And with that global deal, that must be true. I know it’s
currently not a not a pillar yet of the summit, but it is critical that we together work to make that outcome of the summit,
especially to compel creditors to come to the negotiating table early. And the other side of this is everyone loses if all the
countries default. Because the creditors will lose, the people, the economies will lose out. But what we can do is if we have
debt relief with a guarantee, this means that, one we can compel creditors to come early. Two, the creditors that come the
earliest should have preferred access into the new investment opportunities of climate property plans. Because they are partners. And so we hope that moving forward, we can work together towards Accra-Marrakesh. And so in Marrakesh, we
have a route and a way forward that delivers for the most vulnerable. And just to echo the sentiments from Kairos as well
on the climate vulnerable countries having a seat on the table, that’s really critical to any solution that’s being crafted,
because typically climate vulnerable countries are told facts after the time and this is just simply not acceptable. And we see
that in the solutions that we currently have. The G7 V20 Global Shield is certainly an exception because the V20 were
part of the drafting of the solution. And you already see the difference in terms of the scale, in terms of the vision of
delivering financial protection.
Red Constantino: Thanks Sara! Before I turn to the audience, I guess two quick questions as well. So based on what you said, this notion that there is no debt crisis and it’s only a problem of the poor people is not only absurd but dangerous, given what you said. And second, given the scope, the vision of the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda, is it also correct to say it can definitely benefit from inputs from the G20, G24, Bridgetown? So any words before asking the audience?

Sara Ahmed: Yeah, absolutely. I think there are many action items and many asks that are circulating. Not just this year, but actually since 2018 if not earlier. The G20, the G24, the Bridgetown Agenda, and a lot of this is within the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda and are the action items. So building momentum towards Marrakesh, it’s important that we check, we read through the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda and actually determine whether we have the solutions that point to the vision of what the vulnerable countries are looking for in this. And an example of this is the natural disaster clauses. So we see that KfW has a shock resilient debt. So they have this for national development banks and Barbados with the natural disaster clauses, these are speaking to the same thing. So what we need to do is scale these options. So in the Global Shield, for example, it’s looking at a portfolio of solutions. So it includes insurance. It includes linking this to social protection. It also includes these natural disaster clauses as a potential of what the Shield can deliver for countries. And this is the way we need to be looking and approaching the financial architecture. It’s not just we'll have a fund here and a fund there, but rather can we improve the toolkit? Can we ensure that we’re not holding a gun to countries and forcing them to decide? Because then the transformation may take longer and actually it’s cheaper to transform in this decade than it will be in the next decade. So this is actually something for us to realize as well, that if we don’t want to take the tougher decisions in 2040, take it now.

Red Constantino: Perfect. Well, now we’re almost at the end of our session. Just to remind our speakers that after the audience, we get some of the questions and we’ll be asking for one minute each closing statements. Maybe we can turn to questions, if there are any that have come up and thanks to the audience for their patience. Is there a question in the room? There's one question already online. Please introduce yourself.

Franklin Steves: I have a lot of questions. So my name is Franklin Steves with E3G. So Kevin and Jwala referenced the importance of society driving the Jubilee 2000 outcomes. A few weeks earlier, Jamie Drummond who was an activist in that campaign, made a really strong point, a very important point, which is it took a decade build up the campaign in particular that actually helped to put this out there. Right now it’s not happening. It isn’t there. And so you refer to it as the silent debt crisis. How do we begin to develop a global north campaign to back up the success of such an issue? […]

Red Constantino: Kevin?

Jwala Rambarran: That's a very good question. So, first thing - a lot of work has actually been done on debt and climate change. Sara just referenced a number of documents, like the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda. So the work is there. The technical has also been done. Right. I think what is happening now is to sort of start to put these elements together, to look at civil society, say this will actually be my closing remarks, in a sense that we need to develop a Jubilee 2030+. Plus because Jubilee 2000, while it got the debt cancellation, which was the aim, there was nothing around reform of the global financial system. And therefore what we look at what we want to what civil society should be looking for is not only that cancellation, but broader reform around the global financial architecture. I think that's contained in many of the documents that you see there. So I think now is really the story of how do you mobilize. And you said it took 10 years. And it started from zero, from ground zero. I think we know how to accelerate that. I think the time could be a lot, a lot shorter. I mean, we now live in the in the social media age. I mean, so the form of communication, the form of engagement is obviously going to be different. But certainly it might be able to reach the masses. Here is what’s going to be key. Jubilee 2000 - the messenger. So the message is clear, but the messengers are going to be key. You're going to have to decide who will be those messengers. Right. Back in Jubilee 2000, we had Bono, we had the pope. We had a Christian society in the US. You know, we often say, who are those messengers? I can tell you from the Caribbean, we have one messenger that has emerged. That is Prime Minister Mia Mottley. So I put us squarely on the table and say, that’s our champion. I think maybe other regions should look and see who else of similar level do they want to put on the table.
Kevin P. Gallagher: Oh, boy. Well, I’m a white professor from the north, so I’ll criticize the north before saying anything about the south. So I think you’re right that we’ve got the technical stuff done, but we’re just not doing a great job on the sort of narratives, because the - Yes, it was a ten year campaign. And unfortunately, because we have to reduce emissions by 2030, by 45%, we don’t have the ten years. And the good news is, is that finally, actually we are talking about reforming the official buildings, but it’s taken 30 years to get to this. Right. And what they’re talking about are global debt thing yesterday and capital adequacy frameworks are just like movements that are tiny. That’s exactly what’s was happening in 1990, 1995. And so civil society really pushed it and it took ten years, but they did wipe out the debt of all the countries that were there. How do we do that again? Well, the debt and development community that has the infrastructure for this, the campaign attitude and the infrastructure, there needs to be dialog with them, with the climate change community. They are a little suspect of climate change folks, because they’re not sure that the climate change folks fully understand the development dimension of what’s happening and the climate folks need to do a little bit better work on finance and the international financial components of this. And the development component is I would invest a lot at certain kinds of people - creating capacity in both of these places because we have a bigger coalition potential now. Last time it was debt and economic destruction and poverty. It’s the same two things. And now it’s the epistemic crisis of our time. So that should be a campaign organizing umbrella that is much larger than anything that we’ve had in the last century. But our funders and all this kind of stuff is gotten much more professionalized, much more people with ties, talking about all these graphs and tables and that we really need - jeopardizing our center going out of business, but you know, really like you said, the - I mean, we don’t need 150 more studies here. We need boots on the ground. We need a North-South transnational network invested in a major way across all of these different groups to really put pressure in the South on national governments and working with the V20 and the G24 and in the north on the major shareholder, which unfortunately right now really hold the keys. And they only have a very narrow, slow moving sort of climate emissions only vision of it, which isn’t the right vision, and it’s not going to get us more ready to go.

Red Constantino: So there’s a couple more questions that I see. I just want to add a bit to the question as well. A bit of controversy. So we have also have spice. Having been to a number of these discussion engagements, I think it’s important to recognize that while there’s a lot of discussion about capacity building, when you hear that the automatic thing people often refer to is southern NGOs or southern civil society. There is a huge compelling need for capacity building in the north, in civil society, because the governments of the South, especially the V20 economies have a complete agenda, and it’s a robust discussion with their counterparts as well across different governments. And luckily, we have a robust discussion, for instance, with our colleagues from different governments from Germany. And then we have MCII. But it’s a tiny group. We can do with a lot more. In terms of the engagement with northern governments that have been fully briefed by their civil society in their own jurisdictions. Until that happens, it’s a one way street or you can’t dance a tango because there’s only one side that’s willing. So that capacity building in the north is pretty urgent. I know Anna from CECG climate emergency collaboration group.

Audience: Even better than I could have done the acronym. I have one point I would like to make, and actually one more observation, which I would like to see if I understood it right. And one question. So first of all, on the narrative, we did some very good partners called Klaxons who did some narrative testing. And I know you already know Franklin, who basically did that only in the G-7, and they are trying to extend that to the G20 now, but really trying to see what works in the different countries in terms of narrative when it comes to MDB, World Bank reform, but also how we can reframe the trillions, because this is very abstract. You don’t know what trillions are to make it a bit more comprehensive. So talking in terms of GDP percent and I think this is a very good start to think about like a joint narrative. I don’t think it’s the end step, but at least to start where we can, what we can take and take it forward from there. From what I understood from your discussions, and I think that’s very great, is that there seems to be a need for like a political champions group with Mia Mottley, very likely some of the CVF or V20 ministers as well. So potentially like heads of states, finance ministers, I think you would think about? But also like advocacy and an outward facing campaign. Right? So I’m just wondering because I think outward facing campaigning is a skill, not many organizations have these days. Some more than others. And I’m really wondering how you see that play out in a way that it’s not just global north dominated - the jubilees, the ones, the I don’t know what’s, but really also trying to build this ecosystem in the global south to also empower the people to be on the table that need to be. Not just the global north organization say we need those people there, which I think is one side of
the coin, but we also need to have a system where people are on the table without actually actively having to fight for it, I guess. Just wondering how you see that. So we can answer that as well in the closing, because we have a very few minutes left. But again, consistent with what I said earlier, I don’t think we have a global domination, domination of the global North situation. The Global North is missing in this discussion in terms of civil society, and they need to catch up very quickly on issues of debt and climate so. That only the climate groups or also the Jubilees? So the jubilees have always been there, but the climate groups haven’t really been active in terms of wrapping their heads around the debt issue. We have 15 governments pushing things already and you’re in a weird situation where governments are so far ahead. So civil society in the north needs to really catch up to make the discussion work. Questions from the audience.

Audience: So we have Daela that says "Who do you see as specific blockers to advancing your vision of debt relief for green and inclusive recovery? What would it take to move them?" And then we have a second question. "Could you please elaborate on the key differences between Bridgetown Agenda, Accra Marrakesh Agenda and Caribbean Emancipation 2030?"

Red Constantino: Okay. So I’ll give - I’ll give you -

Vositha Wijenayake: How many days do we have?

Red Constantino: The panel will have the impossible task of answering this in one minute. If you can integrate it in your closing already very quickly, one minute or even less, Vositha you go first. Then we will continue with Kai, Kevin, Sara. Vositha, very quickly.

Vositha Wijenayake: Just ten second clarification. This is not just for the questions that Magdalena just read but the closing remarks, Right. Still okay.

Red Constantino: Yeah. Others can pick it up as well. But you may also want to touch on.

Vositha Wijenayake: I would like to skip the two questions. I’m sorry, the audio is a bit bad. So yeah. So if someone else could answer them might be better, I’ll come on last with my one minute closing remarks.

Red Constantino: Thank you. Okay. That’s fine. You also don’t need to answer if either one of you have other stuff to say. Kai here.

Kairos dela Cruz: Yeah. I just think that to respond on the potential blockers and then speaking again based on the context that we just attended the Philippines economic briefing yesterday, is that there’s a strong aversion to accept that you’re in deep debt crisis, particularly for developing countries that are trying to become middle income countries. And I think we do have a lot of work to do on that. On that side of the world. But definitely we would need more northern institutions like the EU to better understand these proposals, given that they’re even owned by global south governments and civil society organizations to connect us to the gatekeepers in the financial and economic spaces. And just to go straight to my closing, I think I’m expecting and will be expecting more stubbornness. I am counting on the V20 and the global South and even the Philippines stubbornness and resolve to continuously refuse to accept a bleak future which will translate to the adoption of some open document as comprehensive and as good as the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda. The key points listed down in the AMA, when they gain support, will allow us you know, developing countries to thrive, not just survive in this changing climate.

Red Constantino: Thank you Kai - Kevin?

Kevin P. Gallagher: I guess the biggest obstacles to really working on debt relief and linking it to climate and development are the private bondholders in the global north. The private bondholders in global North, plus the MVP’s and the Paris Club hold 80% of the debt. And there’s a saying that, in the debt circles, that if you owe me ten bucks, it’s your problem. If you owe me $100 Billion, it’s my problem. Unfortunately, in the world today, it’s ten bucks to the south, whereas in the 1990s it
was the 100 billion. And so that’s where the power is. Private bondholders are also located in the United States, Europe, and London. And they’ve got a real grip on the stakeholders and the shareholders and these international institutions that is holding real reluctance. And so instead, right now, there’s a blame the whole thing on China. And so I also think that the geopolitical thing looming on top of that and plus the sort of real entrenchment of the of the financial sector is a problem. If you want to continue this conversation at 3 o’clock this afternoon, we’re going to release a report that we just came out with that just looks at the IMF on this issue at Carnegie Endowment. 3 o’clock we’re going to have all gone on to Diana, Sara Ahmed and the finance ministers of Kenya and Ghana, as well as the new executive secretary of the G 24.

Red Constantino: Fantastic. Sara.

Sara Jane Ahmed: I think to just to close this, it’s clear that the system we have today, disables development and climate action, which is what we critically need this decade. In terms of the question online, the differences of the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda - The calls from the G20, previously G24, the Bridgetown agenda. I think it’s all clear that we’re all asking for a rewiring of the financial system. And what’s critical here is for us to get on the same page as to what the future looks like and to work alongside each other. We’re looking towards Marrakesh, the inputs from the G20, the G24 and the Bridgetown Agenda could be the key actions of the Accra-Marrakesh Agenda. So there are big solutions being put on the table. But also practical solutions. So that’s the other important thing. There are practical solutions coming out of the spring meetings, coming from years prior, and it’s not all for the UNFCCC arena to solve, but rather here in this space. So it’s important again to ensure that the climate groups are also capacitated to work in this space, because this is where the writers of our faith really sit.

Red Constantino: Jwala?

Jwala Rambarran: Rather than focusing on the differences, I would prefer to focus on the similarities and the aims, because whether it’s Emancipation 2030, Accra-Marrakesh Agenda or Bridgetown Initiative, the aim is how do we address these issues of debt, climate change and development. And let’s focus on the similarities contained in those documents and others so that we can distill that and at least come up with a compelling narrative that could then be used to filter into what I would call Jubilee 2050 plus, because that is where civil society has come in on Converge. Thank you. Vositha?

Vositha Wijenayake: Yes. Sorry about that. Yes. So the first thing I wanted to add was addressing difficulties and how this could be addressed. One would be looking at the proper balances and making sure that the most vulnerable countries have a say in how the debt is addressed and managed and how the transformative processes could include climate aspects into it. I feel that the UNFCCC climate finance and loss and damage finance and all these processes could be an entry point to bring the two or three processes or even more that happen on climate finance debt recovery as well to come together. And civil society do have a role to play. And I agree with the fact that Global South countries and civil society have played a big role and those could be a learning for other countries as well as the global north to have exchange in what could help to have this power balance addressed to the global North action as well as the global South, and then inclusive and participatory processes that would help this imbalance to be addressed and moved away. So thank you very much and sorry for the bad audio from my side. Thank you.

Red Constantino: Thank you Vositha! If I may add the last bit of input, it’s that I think it’s a mistake to have changed levels of support away from debt, for instance, and then towards climate. If we want a solution, the Jubilee need continuous support so that it can be properly integrated with the expertise of climate policy groups right now and as the governments among vulnerable countries are willing to say as often as needed: These are not separate issues that they’re dealing with. They are intertwined, on the ground. There is only one impact, and that is pain. And so those groups need support, including to ledge their power and their muscle. With that. My thanks to the organizers of this event: MCII, SLYCAN Trust, Global Development Policy Center, Financial Futures Center, CPDC and the Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities. Did I miss anything else? No? Then this event is considered closed. Thank you, everyone.